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How to Look the Virginia Gift Horse in The Mouth: Federal Due
Process and Virginia's Arbitrary Abrogation of Capital
Defendant's State-Created Rights
BY: OTTO W. KONRAD
Once a capital defendant has been convicted and sentenced to
death, the Virginia Supreme Court is the last word on any questions
of state law arising out of the trial.' Therefore, because the Virginia
Supreme Court historically has afforded capital defendants very little
relief,2 a trial record devoid of federal issues puts very few judicial
obstacles between the defendant and the electric chair.3 Previous
articles in the Capital Defense Digest have discussed a variety of
federal issues that arise in virtually every capital trial. 4 Further,
previous Digest articles have discussed the importance of properly
preserving federal issues for state and federal appellate review. 5 This
article takes the concern with federal issues in a new direction by
addressing the following question - How can capital defense attor-
neys find federal issues in what appears to be purely state law? The
short answer to this question is "fourteenth amendment due process."
Fourteenth amendment due process encompasses two distinct
groups of interests.6 The first is derived from federal law and includes
those rights protected in the provisions of the Bill of Rights that have
been "incorporated" into the fourteenth amendment.7 The second group
of interests include property and liberty rights that state law has
created.8 Of these two groups of fourteenth amendment interests,
state-created liberty rights are the key to developing new federal
issues out of state capital murder law. This article first will attempt
to define these state-created liberty rights. Second, this article will
distill a methodology from the case law that both identifies these
rights and permits one to ascertain what procedural due process these
rights require. Third, this article will discuss the abrogation of a
number of state-created rights pertaining to Virginia appellate review
of death sentences. Finally, this article will touch on how capital
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defense attorneys can use the state-created rights doctrine to




The United States Supreme Court repeatedly has recognized that
a number of state-created rights or interests exist that, while difficult
to define, "nevertheless are comprehended within the meaning of
'liberty"' as defined in the due process clause. 10 These rights derive
their constitutional status from two factors. They attach to the
individual,I 1 and they find their origins in state law.12 Once the State
has created such a liberty right, the procedural guarantees of the
fourteenth amendment apply whenever the State seeks to alter or
extinguish the right.'
3
Wolff v. McDonne114 is an excellent illustration of such a state-
created right. In Wolff, an inmate claimed that his constitutional rights
were violated when prison authorities deprived him of his good time
credit without notice or hearing. 15 The Court determined that
Nebraska's statutory law afforded all inmates the right to good time
credit unless they were found guilty of serious misconduct.16 The Court
termed this statutory right a 'liberty' interest and held that the
fourteenth amendment sufficiently embraced the right such that the
petitioner was entitled to "those minimum procedures appropriate
under the circumstances and required by the due process clause as to
ensure that [the prisoner's right to good time] is not arbitrarily
abrogated."'
7
Hicks v. Oklahoma1 8 affords another example of state-created
rights in the criminal context. Oklahoma statutory law accorded
criminal defendants the right to jury sentencing. 19 Recognizing this
statutory right as a liberty interest, the United States Supreme Court
held in Hicks that Oklahoma abrogated this state-created right when
the Oklahoma Criminal Court of Appeals affirmed a criminal
defendant's invalid sentence on the basis that a jury could have
awarded the same sentence in a valid manner.20 The Court stated:
Where... a State has provided for the imposition of criminal
punishment in the discretion of the trial jury . . . [t]he
defendant in such a case has a substantial and legitimate
expectation that he will be deprived of his liberty only to the
extent determined by the jury in the exercise of its statutory
discretion, . . . and that liberty interest is one that the
Fourteenth Amendment preserves against arbitrary depri-
vation by the State .... In this case Oklahoma denied the
petitioner the jury sentence to which he was entitled under
state law .... Such an arbitrary disregard of the petitioner's
right to liberty is a denial of due process of law.
21
Identifying State-Created Rights and Necessary Procedures
In analyzing questions of state-created rights, federal courts have
developed a two-tiered framework. 22 The first stage of the analysis
focuses on determining whether the claimant has a liberty interest that
the fourteenth amendment encompasses.23 To make this determina-
tion, courts typically look to the text of state law.24 However, regu-
lations implementing a state statute and official policies or practices
also can establish state-created rights embodying a liberty interest.
25
Identifying these liberty interests can sometimes be a simple task in
that the state law, regulation or practice elucidates the interest in a
direct manner. The Hicks case is an excellent case in point. Oklahoma
in no uncertain terms afforded all criminal defendants the right to have
the trial jury set their sentences. 26 When the Court examined this
statutory language, it summarily concluded that the language afforded
criminal defendants a liberty interest.
27
In contrast to Oklahoma's straightforward law affording crimi-
nal defendants the right to jury sentencing, states can be more indirect
when they create a liberty interest. For instance, quite often state law
will establish a liberty interest by conferring a right on an individual
and conditioning alteration orremoval of the right on either occurrence
of certain events or the State making certain findings. 28 Greenholtz
v. Nebraska PenalInmates29 illustrates this form of a liberty interest.
30
The Court considered whether the following statutory language cre-
ated a.liberty interest:
Whenever the Board of Parole considers the release of a
committed offender who is eligible for release on parole, it
shall order his release unless it is of the opinion that his
release should be deferred because:
(a) There is a substantial risk that he will not conform to the
conditions of parole;
(b) His release would depreciate the seriousness of his crime
or promote disrespect for law;
(c) His release would have a substantial effect on institu-
tional discipline; or
(d) His continued correctional treatment, medical care or
vocational or other training in the facility will substantially
enhance his capacity to lead a law abiding life when released
at a later date.
3 1
Focusing on the "shall order his release" language followed by the
four conditions, the Court held that the statutory provision conferred
on the Nebraska prisoners an "expectancy" of release that accorded
prisoners some measure of due process protection.
32
In Meachum v. Fano,33 the Court considered Massachusetts law
authorizing the transfer of prisoners from one correctional institution
to another.34 Unlike the Nebraska parole statute of Greenholtz, the
Court held that the Massachusetts law did not afford prisoners a
liberty interest whose abrogation was conditioned only on specific
findings or occurrences. 35 "On the contrary, transfer in a wide variety
of circumstances is vested in prison officials. '36 Taken in concert,
Meachum and Greenholtz suggest that a court will find a liberty
interest that implicates due process where administration of a statu-
tory right is not completely discretionary.
37
Once the courts have found a state-created right that constitutes
a liberty interest, the courts proceed to the next level of the two-tiered
due process analysis: Identification of those procedures necessary to
protect that liberty interest. 38 In some cases, making this identifica-
tion is no more involved than according a particular liberty right to its
intended recipient.39 For instance, in Hicks v. Oklahoma, having
determined that Oklahoma accorded criminal defendants the right to
be sentenced by a jury, the Court simply remanded the petitioner's
case to the Oklahoma courts for such a jury sentencing proceeding.40
However, more often than not, ascertaining the necessary amount
of procedure is more complicated than just directly according the
recipient his liberty interest. Probably the single most famous piece
of guidance on the subject comes from the United States Supreme
Court case, Wolff v. McDonnel.41 Therein the Court stated that,
having found a liberty interest, the law must accord the liberty
interest's recipient "those minimum procedures appropriate under the
circumstances and required by the Due Process Clause to ensure that
the state-created right is not arbitrarily abrogated."'42 The Court's
directive has limited usefulness, however, because it begs the ques-
tion it seeks to answer, how much procedure is necessary?
The Court provides much more direct guidance in Goss v. Lopez. 43
The Goss Court observed that ascertaining how much procedure a
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liberty interest requires often involves balancing the state's interests
against the liberty interest holder's need for error free determina-
tions.44 In Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, the Court elabo-
rated on this linkage of due process procedure to the need for error-
free decisions: "[Tlhe quantum and quality of the process due in a
particular situation depends upon the need to serve the purpose of
minimizing the risk of error."
'45
The Goss v. Lopez opinion provides an excellent illustration of
the Court's balancing approach. In Goss, a student claimed that school
administrators violated his due process rights when they suspended
the student without affording him a hearing.46 After determining that
the student had a liberty interest in attending school,47 the Court
elucidated the amount of procedure school administrators must afford
a student before revoking the liberty interest. 48 After recognizing that
notice and hearing were the minimum requirements of due process, 49
the Court balanced the student's need for error-free suspension
determinations against the school's need to discipline, educate and
conserve administrative resources.50 The Court observed that af-
fording the student notice and a limited hearing before suspension was
due process that served both the student's and the school's interests in
error-free determinations. 5 1 However, the Court limited the student's
due process entitlement to notice and a hearing, deferring to the
school's interests in educating students, maintaining discipline and
conserving administrative resources. 52 The Court reasoned that ex-
tending the student's due process entitlement to include the right to
confront and cross-examine witnesses and obtain counsel would
overwhelm administrative facilities and resources and destroy the
effectiveness of suspension as a disciplinary and teaching device.
53
The Goss opinion clearly illustrates that determining the amount of
process due a particular liberty interest is an intensely practical and
very fact specific process.
54
Abrogation of State-Created Rights
Pertaining to Appellate Review of Death Sentences
The Virginia legislature has accorded capital defendants a number
of state-created rights pertaining to the direct review of their death
sentences. In many instances these rights arbitrarily are being abrogated
in violation of the defendant's fourteenth amendment right to due
process. These state-created rights are contained in section 17-110.1
of the Virginia Code, which governs the procedure for direct review
of Virginia death sentences. 55 Among its provisions, section 17-
110.1 dictates that the Virginia Supreme Court "shall consider and
determine... [w]hether the sentence of death was imposed under the
influence ofpassion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factor."'56 Section
17.1 10.1 review for passion and prejudice in the sentencing is not
mandated by the federal Constitution. 57 Rather the duty originates
from the Virginia legislature.58 Because of the precatory "shall"
language, this legislative command constitutes a state-created right
affording capital defendants liberty interests. 59 Thus, the Virginia
Supreme Court must conduct its review for passion and prejudice in
a manner that is consonant with the requirements of due process,
something the court consistently has failed to do.
60
Forexample, when conducting section 17-110.1 passion/prejudice
review, the Virginia Supreme Court often finds an absence of sentencer
passion or prejudice on the basis that the record contains evidence of
aggravating factors that justified a sentence of death.61 The following
portion of the Peterson v. Commonwealth62 opinion is illustrative:
As the record shows, Peterson was in constant diffi-
culty with the juvenile authorities from an early age ....
[A]s an adult he was convicted of breaking and entering and
grand larceny .... All this evidence, which the jury and the
trial judge obviously accepted, showed Peterson to be a
dangerous man who would probably commit other acts of
violence if given any opportunity to do so. Accordingly, we
hold that the death sentence was not influenced by any
arbitrary factors.
63
In Peterson, instead of complying with its statutory duty to affirma-
tively look for the "influence of passion, prejudice or other arbitrary
factors," the Virginia Supreme Court presumed the lack of passion or
prejudice after concluding that aggravating factors were present
within the trial record.64 Such a presumption is illogical and errone-
ous. Even if aggravating factors exist and are presented to the
sentencer, passion and prejudice still can influence a sentencer to
impose the death penalty. Indeed, although aggravating factors may
exist, it is conceivable that passion, prejudice or other arbitrary factors
can be the sole impetus causing a sentencer to impose the death
penalty. Nonetheless, despite these truths, the Virginia Supreme
Court repeatedly has presumed the absence of passion or prejudice
from the presence of aggravating factors and thereby has sidestepped
its affirmative duties under Section 17-110.1.65 Thus, the court has
abrogated capital defendants' state-created rights and violated the
fourteenth amendment.
The Virginia Supreme Court also abrogates capital defendants'
rights under section 17-110.1 when the court conducts 17-110.1
passion/prejudice review and considers whether the defendant has
raised particular instances of passion or prejudice in his appeal.66 For
example, when the court in Poyner v. Commonwealth67 reviewed
Poyner's trial record for sentencer passion or prejudice, the court
stated:
[W]e find no evidence that the death penalty imposed in the
Newport News Case was the product of passion or preju-
dice, or that it was arbitrarily imposed. Significantly, de-
fendant does not suggest that passion, prejudice, or arbi-
trariness played any role in the imposition of the death
sentence.68
The Poyner court obviously found the defendant's failure to raise
instances of sentencer passion or prejudice probative of the overall
nonarbitrariness of the defendant's death sentence.69 Such an ap-
proach to administering section 17-110.1 passion/prejudice review is
in direct contravention to the provision's dictates.
Section 17.110.1 affords the capital defendant a mandatory
review for arbitrary sentencing, independent of the appeal process,
that is governed by the defendant's assignments of error.70 Regard-
less of whether or not the defendant points to instances of prejudice,
section 17-110.1 mandates that the Virginia Supreme Court indepen-
dently ascertain that prejudice did not influence the sentencing pro-
cess. 71 When the court gives any evidentiary consideration to the
defendant's briefing when performing this function, it abrogates the
defendant's rights of due process in violation of the fourteenth
amendment.
72
In addition to directing the Virginia Supreme Court to review
capital defendants' penalty trials for passion and prejudice, section
17-110.1 of the Virginia Code also provides that the court "shall
consider and determine . . . [w]hether the sentence of death is
excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases,
considering both the crime and the defendant. '73 Section 17-110.1
further provides that the court is to facilitate this "proportionality"
review by accumulating "the records of all capital felony cases ....
The court shall consider such records as are available as a guide in
determining whether the sentence imposed in the case under review is
excessive. '74 As in the case of 17-110.1 passion/prejudice review,
17-110. 1's proportionality review, though not required by the federal
Constitution, 75 is mandatory under state law. 76 As such it affords the
capital defendant additional liberty interests that the fourteenth
amendment's due process clause protects.
77
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However, as in the case of 17-110.1 passion/prejudice review,
the Virginia Supreme Court abrogates capital defendants' liberty
interest when it conducts proportionality review. In direct contra-
vention to section 17-110.1 (E)'s plain meaning, the court has read
language requiring it to accumulate "the records of all capital felony
cases" for proportionality review to mean collecting the records of
only those capital cases that the court actually reviews.78 The statute's
mandate to collect "the records of all capital felony cases" is clear and
unequivocal, and as a result the court's departure from its terms
constitutes an abrogation of capital defendants' liberty interests that
violates the fourteenth amendment.
79
The Virginia Supreme Court's abrogation of section 17-101.1
has been extensive. As of August 1990, only ten of the sixty-seven
capital cases in which the defendant received a life sentence have been
appealed to the Virginia Supreme Court.80 In the remaining fifty-
seven cases, the court has not accepted the appeals, and their records,
therefore, are not considered when the court conducts section 17-
110.1 proportionality review.8 ' The court's failure to include these
fifty-seven cases leads to a bias towards the affirmance of death
sentences. A proportionality review that excludes from its purview
nearly every case in which the sentencing authority opted for life,
removes from the court's consideration many cases where the defendant
may have committed aggravated capital murders. The exclusion of
these cases tends to lower the court's perception of what conduct will
merit the death penalty. The court's resulting misperceptions deprive
those sentenced to death of their right to the effective proportionality
review that the Virginia legislature intended as a meaningful check
against the arbitrary imposition of the death penalty.
82
The Virginia Supreme Court's abrogation of capital defendants'
liberty interests, as embodied in the various provisions of section 17-
110.1, constitute serious violations of due process. The severity of
these due process violations is underscored when one considers the
number of reversals that have resulted from the Virginia Supreme
Court's passion/prejudice and proportionality review. Since the
Virginia Supreme Court began conducting 17-110.1 appellate review,
the court has not reversed a single death sentence for passion, prejudice
or disproportionality.
83
Further, if one, pursuant to the Court's methodology in Goss,
balances the State's interests in continuing the Virginia Supreme
Court's present applications of 17-110.1 against the capital defendant's
interests in error-free sentencing determinations, the severity of the
Virginia Supreme Court's abrogations becomes even more apparent.
84
As the United States Supreme Court recognized in Murray v.
Giarratanos 5 and Barefoot v. Estelle,86 during the direct review of a
death sentence, a capital defendant has a significant interest in the
reviewing court making error-free determinations. 87 To counter this
interest and support the court's misapplication of section 17-110.1,
the Commonwealth can assert only the State's interest in judicial
economy and efficiency. While in certain contexts such interests can
be compelling, with regard to the correct application of section 17-
110.1 review, they hardly exist. At most, administering section 17-
110. 1 review in a manner consistent with the requirements of federal
due process would cost the Virginia Supreme Court a minimal
increase in time and effort.
Using the State-Created Rights Doctrine to
Refederalize Death Penalty Issues
During the past decade, the federal courts have begun
defederalizing death penalty law. 88 In other words, the federal courts,
including the United States Supreme Court, have begun to back away
from closely regulating state death penalty schemes. 89 Instead, the
courts are leaving the administration of these schemes to the state trial
and appellate courts. Evidence of this movement can be seen in a
number of recent United States Supreme Court decisions. For example,
in Wainwright v. Witt,90 the Court afforded a presumption of cor-
rectness to trial courts' rulings on motions to remove prospective
jurors for cause. 91 The Wainwright holding effectively curtails fed-
eral courts from reviewing whether a trial court has violated a capital
defendant's sixth amendment right to an impartial jury by refusing to
unseat a prospective juror for cause. 92 In Cabanna v. Bullock93 and
Clemons v. Mississippi,94 the Court held that state appellate courts can
conduct the fact-finding necessary to impose the death penalty,
thereby potentially precluding federal courts from reviewing the
correctness of a trial court's imposition of the death sentence. 95
Finally, in Lewis v. Jeffers,96 the Court directed the lower federal
courts to apply a mere rationality standard when considering whether
the evidence presented at a capital murdertrial supported a defendant's
conviction and sentence.97 The Court's holding reduces the degree of
scrutiny that federal courts will apply to the state court applications of
capital murder schemes. 98
In the present environment of judicial defederalization of death
penalty law, developing new federal issues can be very difficult for the
capital defense attorney. In that regard the state-created rights
doctrine can be used as a means to identify federal issues in what
appears to be purely state law. 99 Further, where the federal courts
close down a particular avenue of federal claims, the state-created
rights doctrine can be used to reframe those federal claims in an
alternate federal form. Virginia's vileness aggravating factor,100 in
concert with the United States Supreme Court case, Lowenfield v.
Phelps,10 1 provides an excellent illustration of this latter use for the
state-created rights doctrine.
One of the Clearinghouse's continuing federal claims is that the
specific terms of Virginia's "vileness" aggravating factor (which
include "depravity of mind," "torture" and "aggravated battery"),
102
are so vague as to afford inadequate guidance to the sentencer in a
capital murder trial, thereby violating the eighth amendment's pro-
hibition against the arbitrary imposition of the death penalty.
103
Lowenfield v. Phelps suggests the following counter-argument: (1)
Where a state's capital murder scheme defines capital murder in a
narrow fashion, conditioning the death sentence on the sentencer
finding certain aggravating factors is not constitutionally required.
04
(2) Virginia's capital murder scheme narrowly defines capital mur-
der, and thus, its statutory aggravating factors, including vileness, are
not constitutionally required. 105 (3) Therefore, even if the specific
terms of Virginia's vileness factor are vague, any arbitrary sentencer
action resulting from their application is harmless error from the
perspective of the federal Constitution.
106
At first glance, the above described counter-argument appears to
nullify a capital defendant's eighth amendment challenge to Virginia's
vileness factor, thereby defederalizing the claim. 107 However, even
assuming that Lowenfield can be interpreted and used in this fash-
ion,108 the capital defense attorney can use the state-created rights
doctrine to reframe the eighth amendment challenge to the vileness
factor into a due process claim. Because the Virginia legislature
conditioned the imposition of the death penalty on the sentencer
finding an aggravating factor such as vileness, 109 capital defendants
have liberty interests protected by the fourteenth amendment. 110 As
a result, Virginia courts must administer the statutory aggravators in
a manner consonant with federal due process.ll If the aggravating
factor is so vague as to permit arbitrary sentencing, then fourteenth
amendment due process mandates that the State implement those
procedures that will minimize the risk of error 112 - for instance,




The state-created rights doctrine is a flexible principle that
should have multiple applications within Virginia death penalty law.
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This article has concentrated primarily upon those state-created rights
encompassed within section 17.110.1 and Virginia's vileness aggra-
vating factor. However, state-created rights applicable to Virginia
capital defendants also include the triggerman rule, 114 state habeas
115
and section 19.2-264.3:1's provisions for defense mental health
experts.116 As capital defense attorneys come into contact with these
and other state-created rights, they should remain alert for possible
due process violations that may arise from the interaction between
these state-created rights and the particular facts of their cases.
Further, capital defense attorneys should bear in mind that the state-
created rights doctrine can afford a means to refederalize claims that
the federal courts have defederalized.
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GETTING THE MOST AND GIVING THE LEAST FROM VIRGINIA'S
"MENTAL MITIGATION EXPERT" STATUTE
BY: HELEN L. KONRAD
When planning the trial strategy for a capital murder case, a
mental health expert's assistance can be invaluable. At the same time,
it can create unforeseen problems. This paper initially will present the
various methods of obtaining mental health expert assistance and will
then compare the advantages and disadvantages of each method. The
focus, however, will be to decipher Virginia's statutory provision for
providing mental health expert assistance, and to explain how the
statute works in practice.
The United States Supreme Court has held that the Due Process
Clause requires that indigent defendants be provided the "raw mate-
rials" and "basic tools" necessary to marshall their defense. InAke v.
Oklahoma, the Court more specifically held that the right to a mental
health expert is such a "basic tool" and it attaches once the indigent
defendant shows that insanity will be a significant factor in his
defense.I The rationale of Ake has been extended beyond cases where
sanity is at issue. In a capital case, use of a mental health expert can
be a "basic tool" in the presentation of mitigation evidence at the
penalty phase of the trial.
Ake's progeny, however, holds that before the right to the expert
attaches, the defendant must make a detailed and persuasive showing
that the expert is necessary and that the defendant would not receive
a fair trial without the assistance of the expert.2 At present no court
has explicitly formulated a checklist of what must be included in an
Ake motion to meet this detailed and persuasive showing. Nonethe-




Name, qualifications, fees etc. of the expert.
Reasonableness of the cost.
Objective bases for the request.
Subjective bases for the request.
Legal necessity.
Legal entitlement to defense experts.
Inadequacy of available state experts.
Supporting information for all of these factors. 3
The advantages of seeking expert assistance underAke are really
twofold: first, that the attorney is forced to develop a theory of
mitigation almost as a condition of receiving the appointment of the
expert, and second, that once appointed, the expert operates as a
"defense consultant," assisting in the preparation and presentation of
the defendant's case.
The disadvantages are first, that despite the constitutional basis
for the right, no specific showing can ensure appointment of the
expert. Second, this amorphous, yet "basic tool" showing, also must
be heavily substantiated. Finally, Ake does not give the defendant the
right to an expert of the defendant's choosing or even to get the funds
to hire an expert of the defendant's choosing.
Unlike the detailed showing required to receive expert assistance
under Ake, Virginia's three statutory entitlements to receive assis-
tance are less stringent. A capital defendant may receive a competency
evaluation, but only to ensure that the defendant has the capacity to
understand the proceedings against him or to assist his attorney in his
own defense. 4 A capital defendant may also receive a sanity evalu-
ation, but that inquiry is limited to the defendant's sanity at the time
of the offense, and only as it is relevant to the presentation of an
insanity defense.
5
Virginia's third statutory entitlement (3: 1), and the most important
one for a capital defendant, is especially attractive because it auto-
matically provides expert assistance to a defendant merely if (1) he is
charged with or convicted of capital murder, and (2) he is indigent. 6
This easy access is both enhanced and undermined by many specific
provisions of the statute requiring a more detailed inquiry.
As stated above, an indigent defendant charged with or convicted
of capital murder necessitates that the "court appoint one or more
qualified mental health experts to evaluate the defendant and to assist
the defense in the preparation and presentation of information con-
cerning the defendant's history, character, or mental condition.1
7
This disjunctive language permits a situation where the indigent
defendant is charged with capital murder and petitions the court for a
mental health expert. Once the defendant is convicted of capital
murder, the attorney moves the court again for another mental health
expert on a different issue concerning the defendant's history, char-
